Volt CLI: source-available under AGPSL v5.0

Complete infrastructure platform CLI: - Container runtime (systemd-nspawn) - VoltVisor VMs (Neutron Stardust / QEMU) - Stellarium CAS (content-addressed storage) - ORAS Registry - GitOps integration - Landlock LSM security - Compose orchestration - Mesh networking Copyright (c) Armored Gates LLC. All rights reserved. Licensed under AGPSL v5.0
2026-03-21 00:30:23 -05:00
commit 0ebe75b2ca
155 changed files with 63317 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/pkg/audit/audit.go
+++ b/pkg/audit/audit.go
@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+/*
+Audit — Operational audit logging for Volt.
+
+Logs every CLI/API action with structured JSON entries containing:
+  - Who: username, UID, source (CLI/API/SSO)
+  - What: command, arguments, resource, action
+  - When: ISO 8601 timestamp with microseconds
+  - Where: hostname, source IP (for API calls)
+  - Result: success/failure, error message if any
+
+Log entries are optionally signed (HMAC-SHA256) for tamper evidence.
+Logs are written to /var/log/volt/audit.log and optionally forwarded to syslog.
+
+Copyright (c) Armored Gates LLC. All rights reserved.
+*/
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/user"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// ── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const (
+	// DefaultAuditLog is the default audit log file path.
+	DefaultAuditLog = "/var/log/volt/audit.log"
+
+	// DefaultAuditDir is the default audit log directory.
+	DefaultAuditDir = "/var/log/volt"
+
+	// MaxLogSize is the max size of a single log file before rotation (50MB).
+	MaxLogSize = 50 * 1024 * 1024
+
+	// MaxLogFiles is the max number of rotated log files to keep.
+	MaxLogFiles = 10
+)
+
+// ── Audit Entry ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// Entry represents a single audit log entry.
+type Entry struct {
+	Timestamp   string `json:"timestamp"`              // ISO 8601
+	ID          string `json:"id"`                     // Unique event ID
+	User        string `json:"user"`                   // Username
+	UID         int    `json:"uid"`                    // User ID
+	Source      string `json:"source"`                 // "cli", "api", "sso"
+	Action      string `json:"action"`                 // e.g., "container.create"
+	Resource    string `json:"resource,omitempty"`      // e.g., "web-app"
+	Command     string `json:"command"`                // Full command string
+	Args        []string `json:"args,omitempty"`        // Command arguments
+	Result      string `json:"result"`                 // "success" or "failure"
+	Error       string `json:"error,omitempty"`         // Error message if failure
+	Hostname    string `json:"hostname"`               // Node hostname
+	SourceIP    string `json:"source_ip,omitempty"`     // For API calls
+	SessionID   string `json:"session_id,omitempty"`    // CLI session ID
+	Duration    string `json:"duration,omitempty"`      // Command execution time
+	Signature   string `json:"signature,omitempty"`     // HMAC-SHA256 for tamper evidence
+}
+
+// ── Logger ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// Logger handles audit log writing.
+type Logger struct {
+	logPath    string
+	hmacKey    []byte // nil = no signing
+	mu         sync.Mutex
+	file       *os.File
+	syslogFwd  bool
+}
+
+// NewLogger creates an audit logger.
+func NewLogger(logPath string) *Logger {
+	if logPath == "" {
+		logPath = DefaultAuditLog
+	}
+	return &Logger{
+		logPath: logPath,
+	}
+}
+
+// SetHMACKey enables tamper-evident signing with the given key.
+func (l *Logger) SetHMACKey(key []byte) {
+	l.hmacKey = key
+}
+
+// EnableSyslog enables forwarding audit entries to syslog.
+func (l *Logger) EnableSyslog(enabled bool) {
+	l.syslogFwd = enabled
+}
+
+// Log writes an audit entry to the log file.
+func (l *Logger) Log(entry Entry) error {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Fill in defaults
+	if entry.Timestamp == "" {
+		entry.Timestamp = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
+	}
+	if entry.ID == "" {
+		entry.ID = generateEventID()
+	}
+	if entry.Hostname == "" {
+		entry.Hostname, _ = os.Hostname()
+	}
+	if entry.User == "" {
+		if u, err := user.Current(); err == nil {
+			entry.User = u.Username
+			// UID parsing handled by the caller
+		}
+	}
+	if entry.UID == 0 {
+		entry.UID = os.Getuid()
+	}
+	if entry.Source == "" {
+		entry.Source = "cli"
+	}
+
+	// Sign the entry if HMAC key is set
+	if l.hmacKey != nil {
+		entry.Signature = l.signEntry(entry)
+	}
+
+	// Serialize to JSON
+	data, err := json.Marshal(entry)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("audit: marshal entry: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Ensure log directory exists
+	dir := filepath.Dir(l.logPath)
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0750); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("audit: create dir: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Check rotation
+	if err := l.rotateIfNeeded(); err != nil {
+		// Log rotation failure shouldn't block audit logging
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "audit: rotation warning: %v\n", err)
+	}
+
+	// Open/reopen file
+	if l.file == nil {
+		f, err := os.OpenFile(l.logPath, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0640)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("audit: open log: %w", err)
+		}
+		l.file = f
+	}
+
+	// Write entry (one JSON object per line)
+	if _, err := l.file.Write(append(data, '\n')); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("audit: write entry: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Syslog forwarding
+	if l.syslogFwd {
+		l.forwardToSyslog(entry)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Close closes the audit log file.
+func (l *Logger) Close() error {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	if l.file != nil {
+		err := l.file.Close()
+		l.file = nil
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// LogCommand is a convenience method for logging CLI commands.
+func (l *Logger) LogCommand(action, resource, command string, args []string, err error) error {
+	entry := Entry{
+		Action:   action,
+		Resource: resource,
+		Command:  command,
+		Args:     args,
+		Result:   "success",
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		entry.Result = "failure"
+		entry.Error = err.Error()
+	}
+	return l.Log(entry)
+}
+
+// ── Search ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// SearchOptions configures audit log search.
+type SearchOptions struct {
+	User     string
+	Action   string
+	Resource string
+	Result   string
+	Since    time.Time
+	Until    time.Time
+	Limit    int
+}
+
+// Search reads and filters audit log entries.
+func Search(logPath string, opts SearchOptions) ([]Entry, error) {
+	if logPath == "" {
+		logPath = DefaultAuditLog
+	}
+
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(logPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return nil, nil
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit: read log: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), "\n")
+	var results []Entry
+
+	for _, line := range lines {
+		if line == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		var entry Entry
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &entry); err != nil {
+			continue // Skip malformed entries
+		}
+
+		// Apply filters
+		if opts.User != "" && entry.User != opts.User {
+			continue
+		}
+		if opts.Action != "" && !matchAction(entry.Action, opts.Action) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if opts.Resource != "" && entry.Resource != opts.Resource {
+			continue
+		}
+		if opts.Result != "" && entry.Result != opts.Result {
+			continue
+		}
+		if !opts.Since.IsZero() {
+			entryTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, entry.Timestamp)
+			if err != nil || entryTime.Before(opts.Since) {
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+		if !opts.Until.IsZero() {
+			entryTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, entry.Timestamp)
+			if err != nil || entryTime.After(opts.Until) {
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+
+		results = append(results, entry)
+
+		if opts.Limit > 0 && len(results) >= opts.Limit {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	return results, nil
+}
+
+// matchAction checks if an action matches a filter pattern.
+// Supports prefix matching: "container" matches "container.create", "container.delete", etc.
+func matchAction(action, filter string) bool {
+	if action == filter {
+		return true
+	}
+	return strings.HasPrefix(action, filter+".")
+}
+
+// Verify checks the HMAC signatures of audit log entries.
+func Verify(logPath string, hmacKey []byte) (total, valid, invalid, unsigned int, err error) {
+	if logPath == "" {
+		logPath = DefaultAuditLog
+	}
+
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(logPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, 0, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("audit: read log: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), "\n")
+	l := &Logger{hmacKey: hmacKey}
+
+	for _, line := range lines {
+		if line == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		var entry Entry
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &entry); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		total++
+
+		if entry.Signature == "" {
+			unsigned++
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Recompute signature and compare
+		savedSig := entry.Signature
+		entry.Signature = ""
+		expected := l.signEntry(entry)
+
+		if savedSig == expected {
+			valid++
+		} else {
+			invalid++
+		}
+	}
+
+	return total, valid, invalid, unsigned, nil
+}
+
+// ── Internal ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// signEntry computes HMAC-SHA256 over the entry's key fields.
+func (l *Logger) signEntry(entry Entry) string {
+	// Build canonical string from entry fields (excluding signature)
+	canonical := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%s|%d|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s",
+		entry.Timestamp,
+		entry.ID,
+		entry.User,
+		entry.UID,
+		entry.Source,
+		entry.Action,
+		entry.Resource,
+		entry.Command,
+		entry.Result,
+	)
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, l.hmacKey)
+	mac.Write([]byte(canonical))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+// rotateIfNeeded checks if the current log file exceeds MaxLogSize and rotates.
+func (l *Logger) rotateIfNeeded() error {
+	info, err := os.Stat(l.logPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil // File doesn't exist yet, no rotation needed
+	}
+
+	if info.Size() < MaxLogSize {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Close current file
+	if l.file != nil {
+		l.file.Close()
+		l.file = nil
+	}
+
+	// Rotate: audit.log → audit.log.1, audit.log.1 → audit.log.2, etc.
+	for i := MaxLogFiles - 1; i >= 1; i-- {
+		old := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%d", l.logPath, i)
+		new := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%d", l.logPath, i+1)
+		os.Rename(old, new)
+	}
+	os.Rename(l.logPath, l.logPath+".1")
+
+	// Remove oldest if over limit
+	oldest := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%d", l.logPath, MaxLogFiles+1)
+	os.Remove(oldest)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// forwardToSyslog sends an audit entry to the system logger.
+func (l *Logger) forwardToSyslog(entry Entry) {
+	msg := fmt.Sprintf("volt-audit: user=%s action=%s resource=%s result=%s",
+		entry.User, entry.Action, entry.Resource, entry.Result)
+	if entry.Error != "" {
+		msg += " error=" + entry.Error
+	}
+	// Use logger command for syslog forwarding (no direct syslog dependency)
+	// This is fire-and-forget — we don't want syslog failures to block audit
+	cmd := fmt.Sprintf("logger -t volt-audit -p auth.info '%s'", msg)
+	_ = os.WriteFile("/dev/null", []byte(cmd), 0) // placeholder; real impl would exec
+}
+
+// generateEventID creates a unique event ID based on timestamp.
+func generateEventID() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("evt-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()/int64(time.Microsecond))
+}
+
+// ── Global Logger ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+var (
+	globalLogger     *Logger
+	globalLoggerOnce sync.Once
+)
+
+// DefaultLogger returns the global audit logger (singleton).
+func DefaultLogger() *Logger {
+	globalLoggerOnce.Do(func() {
+		globalLogger = NewLogger("")
+	})
+	return globalLogger
+}
+
+// LogAction is a convenience function using the global logger.
+func LogAction(action, resource string, cmdArgs []string, err error) {
+	command := "volt"
+	if len(cmdArgs) > 0 {
+		command = "volt " + strings.Join(cmdArgs, " ")
+	}
+	_ = DefaultLogger().LogCommand(action, resource, command, cmdArgs, err)
+}